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T

he year 1994 was one of the most tumultuous in the modern history
of Mexico. During that year, two major political ﬁgures were
assassinated, an uprising against the federal government began
in the state of Chiapas, and the government attempted to ﬁnance
its deﬁcit payments with various debt instruments. The political instability
caused by the assassinations and the Zapatista uprising, along with continued
economic uncertainty within Mexico, caused foreign investment capital to ﬂee
Mexico. Because of this capital ﬂight, Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo, decided
in December of 1994 to devalue the Mexican currency. Instead of helping the
situation, it actually caused more panic from foreign investors. More capital left
Mexico and the government was in danger of defaulting on its debt payments.
During this time period, President Bill Clinton kept a close eye on the situation
with Mexico. Because of NAFTA and other economic agreements, the Mexican
and American economies were intertwined more than ever. Mexico’s inability to
pay their debts, the increasing political instability, and the downward spiral in the
economy worried many in the United States that it would have an adverse affect
on a still recovering American economy.
On January 11, 1995, President Clinton announced that he was considering
a series of economic measures to help the Mexican economy. On January 18,
1995, after consulting with Congressional leaders, Clinton implored Congress
to approve a series of loan guarantees for the Mexican government to prop
up their ailing economy. On January 31, 1995, because of Congressional
inaction, Clinton announced that he was using his executive authority to
provide the Mexican government, along with funds from the International
Monetary Fund, with billions of dollars in loan guarantees. The president was
widely cheered by the international community for his successful handling of
the crisis (Walt, 2000). Over the next two months, Clinton continued to
talk about the Mexican crisis, providing updates of the situation, holding it
out as exemplar of quick action by the American government, and using it
is an example for international audiences to discuss international economic
regulatory reform. The question that this study seeks to answer is how did
Clinton rhetorically manage the Mexican peso crisis?
Studying Clinton’s rhetoric surrounding the Mexican peso crisis is warranted
on a couple of different levels. First, the study of presidential crisis rhetoric
has been a fruitful line of research for scholars for the past thirty years (for
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examples see: Bass, 1992; Bostdorff, 1994; Butler, 2002;
Cherwitz, 1980; Cherwitz & Zagacki, 1986; Dow, 1989;
Hahn, 1980; Heisey, 1986; Kiewe, 1993; Kuypers, 1997; Paris,
2002; Pratt, 1970; Windt, 1973). However, this literature
focuses primarily on how presidents dealt with various military
interventions. There is little no scholarship focusing on
presidential rhetoric and economic crises. In a survey of the
crisis literature, Bostdorff et. al (2008) argued that one of the
severe weaknesses of this literature is the lack of exploration
of how American presidents tackle tough economic situations.
Considering that a president’s discourse on the economy is one
of the essential aspects of his leadership (Wood, 2007) and
the lack of scholarship on this subject, an analysis of Clinton’s
communication on the Mexican Peso Crisis is warranted.
Additionally, President Clinton is an important transitional
president in the history of American foreign policy. Clinton’s
leadership helped America adapt and manage the transition
from the Cold War to an era of globalization (Clinton Foreign
Policy, 2000). The Mexican peso crisis is an important chapter
in that transition. As yet, there has been no extensive study
of Clinton and the Mexican peso crisis. Considering that the
United States and the world currently face a huge economic
emergency, understanding how the 42nd president managed
this crisis may lay the groundwork for a larger theory about
presidents and economic crisis management, while potentially
establish a best practices model for other political leaders to
emulate. Thus, studying how Clinton rhetorically managed
the Mexican peso crisis has the potential to make theoretical
inroads in the larger literature on crisis rhetoric.
To that end, this essay proceeds in four parts. First, I provide
a brief outline of the literature on presidential crisis rhetoric.
Then, I outline the method for this particular study. Thirdly, I
analyze President Clinton’s rhetoric on the Mexican Peso Crisis
over a two month period. Finally, I draw conclusions from this
analysis.
Crisis Rhetoric
Over the past thirty years there have been a number of studies
conducted on the American presidency and crisis situations.
These studies have covered events like the Cuban Missile Crisis
(Bostdorff, 1994; Pratt, 1970), The Gulf of Tonkin crisis
(Cherwitz & Zagacki, 1986), the Dominican Republic (Bass,
1985), the Mayaguez affair (Hahn, 1990), Grenada (Bostdorff,
1994; Heisey, 1986), Somalia (Butler, 2002), and Kosovo
(Paris, 2002). In these studies, scholars have focused on three
issues when discussing crises: 1) deﬁning what a crisis is; 2)
classifying the different types of speeches; 3) discussing the
different rhetorical strategies presidents use in managing these
crises. When communication scholars focus on presidential
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crises, they argue that they are rhetorical constructions. That is
how a president describes the crisis, creates our understanding
of the situation as a crisis or not (Kuypers, 2006). The reason
for that is that “[I]nternational crises often appear suddenly,
are usually complex, and do not allow easy interpretation by
the public. Presidential statements act to create a stable context
from which to interpret the crisis” (Kuypers, 2006, p. 4 - 5).
In other words, presidential crisis rhetoric serves as a means of
educating the American public about the complex situations that
arise in everyday life. Studies have found that presidential crisis
speeches contain three deﬁning characteristics: 1) the president’s
assertion of possession of “New Facts” about a situation that
deﬁne it as a crisis, 2) a melodramatic comparison between the
pure motives of the United States and the evil motives of the
enemy, and 3) a shifting of the issue, including the policy for
which the President desires support, from a practical, political
context to a moral, ethical context (Dow, 1989).
A second issue in the literature regarding crisis rhetoric has
been the different classiﬁcation schemes. Cherwitz and Zagacki
(1986) divided crisis speeches into two types of discourse:
consummatory and justiﬁcatory. Consummatory rhetoric is
present when the president’s discourse is the only ofﬁcial reply
made by the American government and “endeavor[s] to show
the people of the U.S., as well as the world community, that
enemy attacks were hostile and unprovoked, and that despite
such aggression the U.S. will not respond, for to do so would
justify violence” (p. 309). Justiﬁcatory rhetoric is present
“where presidential discourse was from the very beginning part
of a larger, overt military retaliation taken by the government
of the U.S.” (p. 308) and “focus[es] on explanation and
rationalization of military retaliation” (p. 309). Dow (1989)
argued that crisis situations can be put into two categories:
epideictic and deliberative. Dow argues that “rhetoric which
responds to critical events is characterized by epideictic strategies
that function to allow the audience to reach a communal
understanding of the events which have occurred” (p. 297).
Deliberative rhetorical strategy serves the purpose of gaining
approval for a speciﬁc presidential action, which replaces the
approval of Congress, which would be needed for the president
to make a formal declaration of war (Dow, 1989).
Perhaps, the biggest focus within the scholarship concerning
crisis rhetoric has been on the different rhetorical strategies that
scholars have explored. Paris (2002) demonstrated that President
Clinton got involved in a metaphor war with the Congress
over justifying the intervention into Kosovo. In analyzing the
rhetoric of Presidents Johnson, Eisenhower, and Reagan, as it
related to the Dominican Republic, Lebanon, and Grenada,
Procter (1987) advocated that these presidents asserted that the
United States needed to intervene to quell a chaotic scene, lest
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the violence spread elsewhere. Bostdorff (1994) maintained
that President Reagan used myths of mission and manifest
destiny when justifying the military incursion into Grenada. A
common thread through all these studies is that they argue that
presidential crisis rhetoric is structured by a savage/civilization
binary. Bostdorff (1994) observed that crisis situations are
“conducive to hero vs. villain polarizations” (p. 7). Windt
(1973) asserted that the establishment of good versus evil is
a basic line of argument within crisis rhetoric. Cherwitz and
Zagacki (1986) argue that both types of crisis rhetoric they
study, consummatory and justiﬁcatory, seek to identify and
blame adversaries while at the same time commending U.S.
action (see also Bass, 1985; Cherwitz, 1980; Heisey, 1986). In
other words, presidents deﬁne the enemy in terms that make
it appear as if the enemy is irrational, barbaric, and diabolical.
By contrast, the president will use language that portrays U.S.
action as heroic and righteous with the goal of protecting
democracy and innocent lives.
This review of literature reveals varying conclusions about
presidential crisis rhetoric. First, we can conclude that
scholarship on presidential crisis rhetoric focuses on acts
involving military intervention. Second, presidential crisis
rhetoric are rhetorical constructions that serve as a means for
the American public to understand complex and intricate
international problems. Third, there are different classiﬁcation
systems for crisis rhetoric. Finally, presidential crisis rhetoric for
military intervention shares some common rhetorical strategies,
namely that they justify a call to arms through a savage/
civilization binary. While the conclusions generated here are
important, they also point to some signiﬁcant gaps in the crisis
literature. First and foremost, there is little to no scholarship
on presidential crisis rhetoric relating to how presidents deal
with economic crises at home or abroad. Additionally, after
reading Clinton’s speeches on the crisis situation with Mexico,
it became apparent that Clinton was not using a savage/
civilization binary when advocating solutions to the Mexican
peso crisis. This led me to ultimately conclude that the current
scholarship does not provide a sufﬁcient theoretical guide in
analyzing President Clinton’s rhetoric concerning the Mexican
Peso Crisis. To that end, my analysis approaches studying
Clinton’s discourse in a different manner. Speciﬁcally, I use
a framing analysis to demonstrate the dominant strategies the
president used to navigate this crisis. In the following section,
I expand on what a framing analysis is and the data for this
particular study.
Methodology
The methodology for this research is a qualitative textual
analysis; in particular, this study utilizes a framing analysis to
look at the collected data. A frame is a “central organizing
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idea for making sense of relevant events and suggesting what
is at issue” (Kuypers, 2006, p. 7). The process of framing, as
Entman (2003) described it, is the selecting and highlighting
some facets of events or issues, and making connections among
them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation,
and/or solution. Frames are powerful because they help
“induce us to ﬁlter our perceptions of the world in particular
ways, essentially making some aspects of our multidimensional
reality more noticeable than other aspects” (Kuypers, 2006, p.
186). Framing provides the means to make some information
more salient than others. They work to highlight some features
of reality, while drawing our attention away from others
(Entman, 1993; Gandy & Li, 2005; Kuypers, 2006). For
the general public, framing can shape the ways in which the
general public can understand various problems. Considering
that the president is the most important actor in American
foreign policy and that the American public has little to no
understanding of international affairs, the president’s rhetoric
shapes the ways in which the general public understands events
outside the United States. The way the president frames
international events, including crises, affects how the public
will view those events.
Framing, as a method, provides the critic with the ability to
describe the power of a particular text (Entman, 1993). A
framing analysis entails the critic analyzing the whole text
searching within the discourse to ﬁnd the dominant frames
used. Critics look for key words, metaphors, concepts,
symbols, and visual images, to determine the dominant frames
(Entman, 1991). The critic then takes these keywords and
reassembles them in to larger thematic frames, which reveal the
dominant frames used by the rhetor to construct the reality of
the situation. In this analysis, I will be examining a variety of
public documents to determine the dominant frames Clinton
used to construct his version of reality regarding the Mexican
peso crisis and analyzing why that construction was considered
a success.
The data for this research is all of the public statements made
by Clinton over a two month period from January 1995 to
March 1995. All of those documents are accessible through
The Public Papers of the President, which can be found through
accessing The American Presidency Project, an online database
run by the University of California, Santa Barbara that has
every public statement made by every president since 1789.
A preliminary investigation of this database, using a key word
search of “Mexico” and “economy” over this two month
period, revealed over forty statements that may be relevant to
this project. Further investigation will mostly likely winnow
this amount down somewhat, but there still will be plenty of
data to complete this project.
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The framing procedure used after the date was collected started
with an initial read through to gain a broad understanding of
the rhetoric; following, there was a second and third reading
where I searched for keywords and important phrases within
the speeches; all the data was then collected onto a data sheet
where it was then gone through again and further analyzed to
pull out the particular frames being used by President Clinton.
From that data, it was determined that three frames main
frames were used throughout Clinton’s speeches: the nature of
the crisis, a catalytic event, and the promotion of a solution.
Analysis
The Nature of the Crisis
Throughout the Mexican Peso Crisis, President Clinton and
his foreign policy team attempted to educate the American
public on the crisis to generate their support for any solutions
created by the administration. The president explained that:
[T]his crisis came about because Mexico relied too
heavily upon short-term foreign loans to pay for the
huge upsurge in its imports from the United States
and from other countries. A large amount of the debts
came due at a time when, because of the nature of
the debts, it caused a serious cash ﬂow problem for
Mexico, much like a family that expects to pay for a
new home with the proceeds from the sale of its old
house only to have the sale fall through” (1995d, ¶.
13; 1995e, ¶. 9).
Mexico’s cash problems, according to Clinton, created a “shortterm liquidity crisis” and a large “budget deﬁcit” (see 1995c;
1995d; 1995e; 1995g). Additionally, as Clinton’s foreign policy
team noted, this liquidity crisis caused the Mexican currency,
the peso, to “hit an all time low” and drove the Mexican stock
market down as much as “8 percent” (1995g, ¶. 21).
In explaining the crisis to his fellow Americans, Clinton had
two individual focuses. First, he upholds that the crisis is going
to be a “short term” crisis and not a long-term issue. This
assures the American people that this is not something they
are going to have to deal with for decades to come but, rather,
is something that will be over relatively quick. Next, Clinton
implores the analogy of a family for two speciﬁc reasons. First,
this analogy is something that really helps him to connect
with the American public, whom are known to be very family
oriented individuals. Second, the analogy implies that Mexico
is a part of the ‘American family,’ a child needing to be brought
in from the cold. Both of the implied meanings are meant
by Clinton to draw sympathy for the Mexican economy and
Mexican people.
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A Catalytic Impact
Clinton framed the crisis created from Mexico’s “cash ﬂow
problem” as having a “catalytic impact” upon the Mexican,
American, and global economies. We already noted some of
the effects that it had on the Mexican economy. However,
Clinton spent most of time discussing two larger threads of
thought. The ﬁrst thread running through the Catalytic Impact
frame is on the effects it would have on the American economy
and its leadership. In terms of the American economy, Clinton
argued that the Mexican Peso crisis was important “for the sake
of millions of Americans whose jobs and livelihoods are tied to
Mexico’s well-being” (1995e, ¶. 3). Clinton maintained that:
Every American should understand what’s at stake and
why it’s in the interest of working men and women all
across our country to support Mexico. Mexico is our
third largest trading partner. And already the goods
and services we sell there support 700,000 American
jobs. Helping Mexico remain a strong and growing
market for our exports is vital to our ability to help
create the kind of high-paying jobs that give people
their shot at the American dream.” (1995e, ¶. 5)
Clinton further spoke of the crisis as a “danger to the economic
future of the United States” (1995d, ¶. 6) because of our
close ties to the Mexican economy, with so many American
jobs being completely dependent on a “stable and prosperous”
Mexico (1995c, ¶. 1). Therefore, Clinton stated that it was
in “America’s economic and strategic interest that Mexico
succeeds.” (1995b, ¶. 3) Clinton spoke further of the crisis as
a “test of American leadership.” (1995g, ¶. 18) He maintained
that everything happening in Mexico was “America’s problem”
(1995h, ¶. 4) and that it is, therefore, our job to take action
and help to “give the Mexican people renewed hope for a more
secure future.” (1995h, ¶. 4)
Another of Clinton’s focuses was on the effect that the crisis in
Mexico could have on the remainder of the world’s economies,
particularly in Latin America. Clinton described the effect
that the crisis could have on these economies as analogues of a
virus that could “spread to other emerging countries in Latin
America and in Asia” (1995d, ¶. 10). Failure to act, Clinton
said, would have “grave consequences for Mexico, for Latin
America, for the entire developing world” (1995f, ¶. 17).
The reason for this, Clinton said, is that Mexico acts as a sort
of “bellwether for the rest of Latin America and developing
countries throughout the world” (1995a, ¶. 26).
Promoting a Solution
The effect that the Mexican Peso crisis would have had on
America and the rest of the world lead Clinton to promote a
BRIDGEWATER STATE COLLEGE

solution for the crisis. Clinton assured the American people
that the loan mechanism that he and his staff wanted to put
into place was not a loan but a guarantee. He stated that:
These guarantees, it’s important to note, are not foreign
aid. They are not a gift. They are not a bailout. They
are not United States Government loans. They will
not affect our current budget situation. Rather they
are the equivalent of co-signing a note, a note that
Mexico can use to borrow money on its own account.
(see 1995d, ¶. 15; 1995e, ¶. 10)
In this respect, Clinton is trying to show that America is merely
going to act as an aid to Mexico and that after obtaining the
aid Mexico will end out handling the situation on its own.
However, this contradicts a previous statement by Clinton
where he made Mexico seem like a child that needed to be
brought in from the cold and cared for. These statements draw
a line in the discourse, but are present in many other issues in
America’s history with Mexico where it always seems that while
the United States government wants to aid Mexico, at the same
time it wants Mexico to fend for itself.
The next important thread that Clinton uses in promoting a
solution to the Mexican Peso crisis is assuring the American
people that using this form of loan mechanism are not risky
for the United States. Clinton emphasized that the United
States has had “loan mechanisms in place with Mexico
since 1941” and that “Mexico has always made good on its
obligations” (1995d, ¶. 16). While promoting a solution
for this crisis, Clinton reiterated the point that Mexico had
made “extraordinary progress” in recent years and had “erased
a budget deﬁcit” (1995d, ¶. 11). Clinton effectually used
this past trust that the United States has with Mexico and the
progress that the country had been making previous to the crisis
to help reassure the American people that aiding Mexico was
not a risky move for the United States. Further, he reassured
the American people by promising that “Mexico will make
an advance payment to us, like an insurance premium. No
guarantees will be issued until we are satisﬁed that Mexico can
provide the assured means of repayment” (1995d, ¶. 15).
Conclusions
In this study, I utilized a framing analysis to discover how
Clinton managed the Mexican Peso Crisis. In my analysis it
was discovered that Clinton used three basic frames: the nature
of the crisis, a catalytic impact, and promoting a solution. When
discussing the nature of the crisis, Clinton had two main
focuses. First, he related that the crisis was a “short-term” issue
and not a long term problem. Second, Clinton implored the
analogy of a family within his rhetoric. When discussing the
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catalytic impact Clinton primarily focused on the effect that
it would have on the American economy, as well as the effect
that it would have on Latin America and the rest of the world
economies. When promoting a solution, Clinton ﬁrst detailed
the loan mechanism that he and his staff wanted to put into
place. Finally, Clinton reassured the American people that aiding
Mexico was not going to be risky for the American economy
by maintaining the United States has had a long standing loan
mechanism in place with Mexico and that Mexico has always
repaid their debts.
What we see from this analysis is that while Clinton’s rhetoric
on the Mexican Peso crisis shares many of the characterizations
already given to crisis rhetoric by scholars, the rhetoric also has
several differences. For example, while Clinton’s rhetoric was a
part of the United States action during the crisis there was no
justiﬁcation of military action by the government along with
it. If you’d recall, there was also no savage/civilization binary
found within Clinton’s speeches, which points to an absence
of an ‘enemy’ or ‘villain’ within rhetoric. However, Bostdorff
and O’Rourke (1997) found that only domestic crises do not
contain villains. They maintained that “domestic crises do not
readily provide a tangible villain against which the nation can
unite” (1997, p. 346). Further, while some of Clinton’s rhetoric
on the Mexican Peso Crisis could be classiﬁed as ‘deliberative’
(as he is seeking approval by Congress to take action) in the
end, Clinton took action on his own and, therefore, was no
longer seeking approval. This leaves the remainder of Clinton’s
rhetoric on the subject without a clear classiﬁcation, as set
by Bonnie Dow. From this we can conclude that we need
a different way in which to look at economic crisis rhetoric
because what we would typically ﬁnd in other forms of crisis
rhetoric is not present here.
In comparing this study’s ﬁndings with Bostdorff and
O’Rourke’s study of President Kennedy and the U.S. Steel
Crisis of 1962 I found that there were many similarities in the
way that both presidents handled their crises. Like Clinton,
Kennedy ﬁrst explained what the problem was to the American
people before detailing what the effects of this problem would
be if it were not to be resolved quickly and ﬁnally offering a
solution for the crisis. It is for this reason that I would propose
that this study be used as a model for future studies dealing
with economic crisis rhetoric.
References
Bass, J. D. (1985). The appeal to efﬁciency as narrative closure: Lyndon
Johnson and the Dominican crisis. Southern Speech Communication
Journal, 50, 103-120.

2010 • THE UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW • 33

Bostdorff, D.M. (1994). The presidency and the rhetoric of foreign
crisis. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press.
Bostdorff, D.M., Carcasson, M., Farrell, J.M., Ivie, R.L., Kiewe, A., &
Smith, K.B. (2008). Report of the national task force on presidential
rhetoric in times of crisis. In J.A. Aune and M.J. Medhurst (Eds.)
The prospect of presidential rhetoric. College Station, TX: Texas A&M
University Press.
Butler, J. R. (2002). The imperial savage and the continuities of war.
Western Journal of Communication, 66, 1-24.
Cherwitz, R. A. (1980). Making inconsistency: The Tonkin Gulf
Crisis. Communication Quarterly, 28, 27-37.
Cherwitz, R. A., & Zagacki, K. S. (1986). Consummatory
versus justiﬁcatory crisis rhetoric. The Western Journal of Speech
Communication, 50, 307-324.
Clinton’s foreign policy. (2000). Foreign Policy, 18-28.
Clinton, W.J. (1995a, January 11). The president’s news conference
with Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama of Japan. Retrieved
March 3, 2009 from J. Woosley and G. Peters (Eds.) The American
presidency project. Santa Barbara: University of California. http://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index/php?pid=55157.
Clinton, W.J. (1995b, January 11). Statement on the economic
situation in Mexico. Retrieved March 3, 2009 from J. Woosley and
G. Peters (Eds.) The American presidency project. Santa Barbara:
University of California. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.
php?pid=51179.
Clinton, W.J. (1995c, January 12). Background brieﬁng with senior
administration ofﬁcials. Retrieved March 3, 2009 from J. Woosley
and G. Peters (Eds.) The American presidency project. Santa Barbara:
University of California.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?pid=59417.
Clinton, W.J. (1995d, January 18). Remarks on loan guarantees
for Mexico. Retrieved March 3, 2009 from J. Woosley and G.
Peters (Eds.) The American presidency project. Santa Barbara:
University of California. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.
php?pid51423.
Clinton, W.J. (1995e, January 21). The president’s radio address.
Retrieved March 3, 2009 from J. Woosley and G. Peters (Eds.) The
American presidency project. Santa Barbara: University of California.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?pid51556.
Clinton, W.J. (1995F, January 26). Address before a joint session of
the Congress on the
State of the Union. Retrieved March 9, 2009 from J. Woosley and
G. Peters (Eds.) The American presidency project. Santa Barbara:
University of California. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.
php?pid51634.

Christopher and Secretary of Treasury Robert Rubin. Retrieved
March 9, 2009 from J. Woosley and G. Peters (Eds.) The American
presidency project. Santa Barbara: University of California.http://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?pid59466.
Clinton, W.J. (1995h, January 31). Remarks on Mexico’s Repayment
of Loans and an Exchange with Reporters. Retrieved March 9, 2009
from J. Woosley and G. Peters (Eds.) The American presidency project.
Santa Barbara: University of California.http://www.presidency.ucsb.
edu/ws/print.php?pid59466.
Dow, B. J. (1989). The function of epideictic and deliberative strategies
in presidential crisis rhetoric. Western Journal of Communication, 53,
294-317.
Entman, R. (1991). Framing U.S. coverage of international news:
Contrasts in narratives of the KAL and Iran Air incidents. Journal of
Communication, 41, 6-27.
Entman, R. (1993). Framing: Toward clariﬁcation of a fractured
paradigm. Journal of Communication, 43, 51-58.
Entman, R. (2003). Projections of power: Framing news, public opinion,
and U.S. foreign policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Hahn, D.F. (1980). Corrupt rhetoric: President Ford and the
Mayaguez affair. Communication Quarterly, 28, 38-43.
Heisey, D. R. (1986). Regan and Mitterand respond to international
crisis: Creating versus transcending appearances. Western Journal of
Communication, 50, 325-335.
Kiewe, A. (1993). The modern presidency and crisis rhetoric. Westport,
CT: Praeger.
Kuypers, J.A. (2006). Bush’s war: Media bias and justiﬁcations for war
in a terrorist age. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
Kuypers, J.A. (1997). Presidential crisis rhetoric and the press in the
post-Cold War world. Westport, CT: Praeger.
Paris, R.F. (2002). Kosovo and the metaphor war. Political Science
Quarterly, 117, 423-450.
Pratt, J.W. (1970). An analysis of three crisis speeches. Western
Journal of Communication, 34, 194-203.
Procter, D. E. (1987). The rescue mission: Assigning guilt to a chaotic
scene. The Western Journal of Speech Communication, 51, 245-255.
Walt, S.M. (2000). Two cheers for Clinton’s foreign policy. Foreign
Affairs, 79, 63-79.
Windt, T.O, Jr. (1973). The presidency and speeches on international
crisis: Repeating the rhetorical past. Speaker and Gavel, 11, 6-14.
Wood, B.D. (2007). The politics of economic leadership: The causes
and consequences of presidential rhetoric. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.

Clinton, W.J. (1995g, January 31). Press brieﬁng by Secretary of
State Warren

34 • THE UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW • 2010

BRIDGEWATER STATE COLLEGE

